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1HENAN - THE MODEL: FROM HEGEMONISM TO FRAGMENTISM
Portrait of the Political Culture of China's Most Populated Province
Thomas Heberer/Sabine Jakobi1
1 Introduction
In this paper we will address characteristics of Henan's political culture, the collective
memory or consciousness of its people and its process of political development in recent
history. The four dimensions we will focus on are: (a) geographic, (b) historical/cultural, (c)
social-rebellious, and (d) political.
Arguing on a historical basis we will first develop two patterns of interpretation which are not
only relevant for Henan’s specific culture and for its socioeconomic development, but seem to
have special explanatory powers. The two patterns of interpretation are first an awareness of
Henan's rich cultural history and political tradition and second a widespread phenomenon of
egalitarianism related to communitarism. These two patterns of interpretation are strongly
interconnected, since egalitarianism might be understood as a subset or a feature of the
general cultural heritage. However, for analytic purpose we want to differentiate between a
deep-rooted sense of loss of Henan's central role in China and a single prominent feature of
this heritage, egalitarianism related to communitarism, that we believe to be most influential
even in modern times. In addition, we will demonstrate these two patterns together spurred an
historic development of "modelism" in Henan, primarily with the objective regaining a
prominent place in the Middle Kingdom.2 In this context we, nevertheless, do not argue for
one traditional culture, since this term implicates a homogenity and unambiguity that never
existed in reality. Instead, we develop a concept of a pluralistic culture and refer to a culture
with different raditions. We conceive of egalitarism as both an attitude and a way of living
deeply rooted in an emphasis on community life and in the idea of mutual survival. As the
essence of historical experience, egalitarianism can still be traced in contemporary Henan.
Next we address on to the modern-day era of Communist China and explicate different
development strategies applied by the provincial leadership in an effort to catch up with more
developed regions in China, especially with the booming coastal areas. These strategies,
whose nature can clearly be understood as a continuation on the historical processes described
in this paper, are directed to returning Henan to its traditional place of prominence within
modern China. From 1949 on Henan was a model province in every political campaign and
produced numerous model units with national importance. Since the beginning of the reform
process Henan is no longer a "model", but seems to accept that it is one of the less-developed
provinces that requires economic development. However Henan-derived models still exist.
                                         
1 This is a revised and enlarged version of a paper presented at the "International Conference on China's
Provinces in Reform", held in Kunming/China, October 4-7 1998. The paper is based both on a literature
review and extensive fieldwork untertaken in summer 1996 in Henan province by Thomas Heberer and
several long-term research visits of Sabine Jakobi in 1991, 1995/96 and summer 1996. While both authors
cooperated in constituting and editing this paper, Thomas Heberer is solely responsible for the chapter on
Nanjie.
2 The authors are aware that their political culture-argument regarding the Henanese disposition towards
egalitarianism and the inhabitants' special cultural awareness requires more systematic empirical research.
The reader therefore should regard our argument as an scientific hypothesis deriving from fieldwork in that
area.
2Employing Nanjie, one of the present-day "models" as a case study, we will conclude our
paper by arguing that Henan is still producing models. However there is no longer a unique
type, but a range that extends from models in terms of collective structures to those of private
economic patterns. Henan is thus evolving from a hegemonic or one-dimensional political
model to a fragmented one.
We do not claim that the picture we paint in this paper is complete or free of inconsistencies.
On the contrary, we deeply encourage review and further empirical examination. Due to the
limited availability of data below the provincial level, intra-provincial differences are by-and-
large not considered. Furthermore, rather than presenting a thorough analysis of contemporary
economic factors, we elected an historical approach to the province's political culture in order
to trace the origins of contemporary Henan.
Because Henan is the most populous Chinese province, and therefore plays a strategic role in
Chinese politics, a careful examination of this region and its prospects for future development
is important.3 However, we do not claim that Henan is unique, since several of the features we
address also exist in other provinces in Central China such as Shaanxi or Anhui. Rather it is
the special combination of features that brings about the particular Henanese pattern of
hegemonic and fragmented "modelism".
2 The Geographical Dimension: Yellow River, Loess and Natural Calamities
The history of the province is full of natural calamities, although Henan possesses a multitude
of natural resources and was a major granary. For the last 2100 years the Chinese annals
identify 982 such events involving Henan.4 There is no year without droughts and/or
disastrous floods. The frequency of natural catastrophes is connected to the geographical and
climatic conditions: a period of heavy cloudbursts in June and July is followed by a rainless
period of eight months. Every year droughts strike the province. On average, one tenth of its
cultivable land is affected. Locust, sand and other storms also plague the province. Everything
depends on the water. The fertile loess ground requires an sophisticated and intact irrigation
system. However, the biggest source of running water, the Yellow River, often called "China's
sorrow", has changed its course many times and with it also the agricultural conditions.5 This
happened 21 times in the course of written history in its lower reaches. Thus the map of
China's North changed 21 times. The lability of the course of the lower reaches of the river
was due to tremendous loading with loess and sediments (1.6 bill. tons per year, of which 400
mio tons are deposited in the lower reaches). Consequently, the bed of the river raises about
10 cm per year. The lower reaches, which are no longer able to absorb flow from tributaries,
are protected by a connecting-dike of 1,356 km length. Every tidal wave poses danger. Floods
and droughts in this highly populated area regularly led to terrible famines.
These calamities had not always been caused by nature. During the peasant uprisings of the
late Ming dynasty, a rebel army under the leadership of Li Zicheng laid siege to the city of
                                         
3 Until recently Henan was outranked by Sichuan province in size of population. However, Henan’s top
position in the actual population ranking is not due to a dramatic increase in fertility productivity, but to the
administrative device of excluding the area of Chongqing city from Sichuan province.
4 Jean-Luc Domenach, The Origins of the Great Leap Forward. The Case of One Chinese Province, Boulder,
San Francisco, Oxford (Westview Press) 1995: p. 5.
5 Inhabitants of this area conceive of the Yellow River both as the “sorrow” and the nourishing “mother” of
China. We will come back later to the prominent role of the river in the formation of an attitude oriented
towards egalitarianism.
3Kaifeng in 1642. After several attempts to break through the defense lines, they opened the
dikes of the nearby Yellow River to flood the city. As a result, 900,000 people were killed.6
During the Taiping-uprising in 1853 a breach in the dikes occured because maintenance was
neglected. The Daqin River, the course of which had already been used by the Yellow River
in former centuries, absorbed the Yellow River. Since then it once again leads into the Bohai-
Gulf. Millions of people were victims of raging natural forces, and the consequences of these
disasters to the economy of and traffic in the Northern Chinese plain were devasting. In 1938
Chiang Kai-shek gave orders to the Sector Commander to blow up a dike near Huayuankou to
stop the Japanese advance. The resulting torrents destroyed 11 cities and 4,000 villages,
including the homes of 12 mio people, ruined the harvest of three provinces, and rendered
arable land unarable by covering it with spreading sand and mud. Approximately 890,000
people died.
The human casualties from famines are legendary. In North China, in the provinces of Shanxi,
Shaanxi, Hebei, Henan and Shandong, 9-13 mio people died from 1876-79 during the great
droughts and the following famines, and from 1892-94 another one million people lost their
lives. In 1942-43 two to three million people died of starvation in Henan alone.7
3 The Historical and Cultural Dimension: Henan as the Cradle of Chinese Culture and
as an Ancient Power Center
Henan stands out as the origin of Chinese culture, the birthplace of the Chinese nation and
Chinese script as well as the place of origin of Chinese family names. The Henanese are
perceived as descendants of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi), the fictive founder of the
Chinese culture. It was called "Henan" because most of the Henan province is situated south
of the Yellow River. Two thousand years ago its name was Zhongzhou, i. e. the prefecture in
the middle of the nine prefectures which made up China at that time, then Z ongguo, Middle
Kingdom, a label that was later used to name all of China.8 As already explained, Henan's
topography afforded its inhabitants strategically favourable conditions. To the south, west and
northwest several mountain ranges and rivers form a natural boundary, while the plain in the
east could be employed to produce two or three harvests of grain a year. These conditions
may explain why Henan was the residence of 19 dynasties in Chinese history. Henanese
culture is also composed by Shaolin monastery and Kongfu martial arts, as well as by
"Yugong yi shan" - the story of the Foolish Old Man who removed the mountains.
One of the earliest and most densely populated areas in Neolithic times, Henan is considered
to be the ancient political, economic and cultural center of China. The Neolithic cultures of
Yangshao and Longshan were located in today's Henan. At Anyang the remains of the last
capital of the Shang dynasty (16-11 century B.C.) were excavated. The Eastern Zhou dynasty
(770-221 B.C.) was founded in Luoyang which was also for some time capital of that dynasty.
                                         
6 The city wall, which has been rebuilt in the 12th century under the Jin dynasty, proved to be strong enough to
resist any attack. Thus, after several futile attempts to enter Kaifeng, the rebels resorted to this last means.
For an account of this event, see James Bunyan Parsons, The Peasant Rebellion of the late Ming Dynasty,
Tuscon, Arizona (The University of Arizona Press) 1970: pp. 96-104. Other sources speak of 300,000
victims and assert that it was the defenders themselves who opened the dikes hoping desperately to both be
safe behind the city wall, and to surprise the attackers with the flood. See for example Qu Chunshan, ed.,
Kaifeng lüyou zhinan (Travelguide Kaifeng), Beijing (Zhongguo lüyou chubanshe) 1988: pp. 14-15.
7 Comp. Jacques Gernet, Die chinesische Welt, Frankfurt/M (Insel) 1979: pp. 515-517.; Israel Epstein, China.
Von Sun Jat-Sen zu Mao Tse-Tung, Berlin (Volk und Welt) 1950: pp. 300-301.
8 Comp. Ferdinand Freiherr von Richthofen, China. Ergebnisse eigener Reisen, vol. 2, Berlin (Dietrich
Reimer) 1882: p. 509.
4The early states of the Spring and Autumn period (770-481 B.C.) were situated in that region,
as well as some of the Warring States (475-221 B.C.). The Han Emperors in 25 A.D. moved
their capital from Xi'an to Luoyang, and under the Wei (200-265), Jin (265-420) and Sui
(581-618) dynasties it continued to be the capital. Under the Tang emperors (618-907) it was
second capital only, but remained a cultural and scientific center. Luoyang was important for
every dynasty, because it was near the principal grain growing area of that time.
Kaifeng, another city in Henan province, was capital of the Wei dynasty during the Warring
States, of the Five dynasties (907-960), of the later Liang (as Eastern Capital = dongdu, 555-
587) and the Northern Song (960-1127) dynasties. Various accounts in particular from the
Song era, suggest Kaifeng enjoyed a high standard of living including a thriving fine arts
scene. The famous painting "At Qingming festival on the riverside" (qingming shanghe tu)
gives a vivid impression of a bustling and flourishing capital city of Kaifeng (named
Dongjing at that time). The cosmopolitan tradition of Henan is also reflected in the longtime
existence of a Jewish community in Kaifeng, which existed there until the last century. It is
also in the ancient metropolitan city of Kaifeng that the Henanese tradition of urbanity and
education survived. The Russian sinologist Alekseev who travelled in 1907 together with the
French sinologist and archaeologist Chavannes throughout China, thus noted on his arrival in
Kaifeng:
"Passing through the city, we discover that it is covering a huge area and has a lot
of shops. The buildings are big, like in Peking, they are even more beautiful."9
and
"At the time we return to our hotel it's already dark outside. Only the center of
Kaifeng where we are staying is illuminated bright as day und bursting with life.
It reminds me of London City."10
At the time Alekseev visited Kaifeng, all traces of the Jewish community had already
vanished. However, he gave testimony of a still vivid and rich cultural and religious life
expressed in Muslim, Daoist, Buddhist, Confucian and diverse idiosyncratic rites and
festivals. He also mentions a Catholic mission station with an Italian priest.11
Various emperors and many historical personalities were born in this province: famous
philosophers, including Laozi, Zhuangzi, Han Fei, Lü Buwei and Cheng Yi; politicians such
as Shang Yang and Li Si, military leaders including Yue Fei and Si Mayi; leaders of peasant
movements, for example Cheng Sheng, Wu Guang, Wang Xianzhi and Shen Buhai; poets
such as Li He, Du Fu and Bai Juyi; writers and painters such as, respectively, Han Yu and Wu
Daozi as well as the astronomer Zhang Heng and the medician Zhang Zhongjing, to mention
only a few.
However, with the invasion of the Nuzhen armies (Jürched) and the sacking and destruction
of Kaifeng in 1126, the political power center was moved to the North, and Henan thus lost its
                                         
9 V. M. Alekseev, China im Jahre 1907. Ein Reisetagebuch, Leipzig et al. (Müller und Kiepenheuer) 1989:
p.188. Original published in Russian language in 1958 in Moscow (Izdatel’ stvo vostocnoj Literatury). This
and all following quotations are translated into English by the authors.
10 Alekseev: p. 200.
11 Alekseev: pp. 192-204.
5central position politically and economically. Thereafter, the north became the dominant
center of the empire, with Peking as its capital since the Yuan dynasty (1271).12
As it was the transit point from north to south China, there was continuous, heavy fighting
over the control of Henan; this occurred from ancient times, for instance during the Spring
and Autumn Period and the Warring States (the story of the "Three Kingdoms" gives concrete
examples) to recent history, for example during the warlord era, the Northern Expedition, the
war against the Japanese during World War II and the civil war against the Guomindang. The
province was therefore called the "strategic heart" of China.
In this century, the railroad tracks from north to south and from east to west, which meet in
the provincial capital of Zhengzhou, were and continue to be strategically important. During
the war against Japan the Guomindang requisitioned more grain and recruited more soldiers
from Henan than from any other province.
4 The Rebellious Dimension: Secret Societies and Banditry
Different religious and philosophical trends have a long tradition and are still vivid to various
degrees in contemporary Henan. In this part of our paper we will discuss the history of ideas
that often took on an autonomous, even rebellious dimension. It is this specific tradition of
heretical-folk religious and chiliastic-rebellious movements which still wield influence, in
particular in the countryside, and have caused the modern-day central leadership in Beijing to
look upon Henan with suspicion. The geneses of these movements were primarily natural
disasters such as droughts and floods as well as economic and social impoverishment. Their
popularity can also be traced to the century-old orthodox religious practices, which took on
local forms. Because the central Chinese province of Henan was, - as previously mentioned, -
one of the provinces which was very frequently affected by natural disasters and resulting
famines, sects promising relief and a better future have always flourished here.
Contemporary intellectuals and cadres often criticize the underlying Confucian orientation
(rujia) of the inhabitants of Henan, and argue that their adherence to this old belief system is
responsible for Henan’s socioeconomic "backwardness". The cadres point to practices of folk
Confucianism sharply opposed by Communist government authorities such as the erection or
restoration of ancestral temples and the common villagers practice of using arable land for
burial plots. Confucian values including female chastity and subordination and filial piety to
elders (xiao) present an obstacle to the smooth and quick modernization of society in the view
of the cadres.13 However, as outlined above in our introduction, traditional Chinese culture
has different and various roots that include but certainly are not limited to Confucianism. We
conceive of this plurality of traditions on the whole to constitute a me tality (or habitus in a
Bourdieuan terminology). In the following, we therefore examine four additional religious or
chiliastic folk traditions, in general referred to in Chinese official discourse as "superstition":
                                         
12 Wang Guangpeng, ed., Fenjin de Henan (Vigorous Henan), Zhengzhou (Henan sheng tongjiju) 1994: pp. 7f.;
Huang Liangyi/Sun Baoding/Chen Dang, Henan shengqing gailun (Outline of Henan's provincial situation),
Peking (Zhongguo tongji chubanshe) 1995.
13 This argument was often heard in talks with rural and urban cadres in 1995/96. Note this respect also that
the novels of the classical compilation "Twenty-four historical examples of filial piety" are very popular in
Henanese countryside. For example, in 1996 Sabine Jakobi visited two villages near Luoyang which both
claimed to be the historical setting of the novel of Wang Xiang.
61. Various Daoistic practices relating mainly to agricultural production and health care.
2. Buddhist religious practices such as prayers and sacrifices. For example, the Buddhist
caves of Longmen near Luoyang are not only a famous tourist destination, but are also once
again increasingly visited by peasant believers.
3. The Christian House movement with various intra and inter-villages groups.
4. Heterodox religious and social organizations forming "counter-societies".
Believers of the above-mentioned religions sometimes organized themselves in groups. These
sub-groups were not officially sanctioned and thus constituted in the view of the authorities an
heretic way of practicing religion. Some of these very different unorthodox religious groups
(xiejiao) in Henan had an impressive ability to mobilize their members. They were able to
organize groups of several hundreds to thousands of people for pilgrimages that lasted from 1-
3 months and even crossed provincial borders. As early as in 1793 this phenomenon aroused
attention up through the level of the imperial court, which noted, in part:
"This [long pilgrimages, the authors] holds true in general for Chihli, Shantung,
Shansi, Shensi, and particularly Honan."14
Because the above-mentioned two primary religious traditions are widespread in rural China
in general, we will direct our attention to two other forms which are more Henan specific.
Henan has a strong reputation as the prinicipal base (besides Anhui Province) of the Christian
House Church movement.15 Within these groups we note a tendency towards idiosyncratic
features, characterized by the mixture of Christian with various Daoist and Buddhist practices.
These sects, which were sometimes isolated small communities and sometimes part of a
network in a bigger movement, are regarded by the Communist government as another strong
indication of the "backwardness" of this province and the responsible authorities are therefore
vigorously trying to control them and contain their influence. These sects were forced
underground during the Cultural Revolution and then reemerged as the result of the more
liberal policies of the Deng era. As early as the early 80s of this century, however, followers
of Christian groups were once again persecuted. An oft-cited example is the arrest of
members of the "Shouters" sect, a movement existing in several provinces of China, in Henan
Province in 1983, and the ban on all group activities that public security officials instituted
immediately thereafter.16 The case of the Jesus Family (Yesu jiating) reveals the popularity
and long-standing autonomy of some of these Christian communities.17 This sec  was founded
                                         
14 Sheng-hsün, Kao-tsung, 261/17a-18a; Shih-li (1908), 399/2a, cit. in Kung-Chuan Hsiao, Rural China.
Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, Seattle (University of Washington Press) 1960: p. 230. The Qing
government suspected these pilgrimages might present the possibility to organize social and/or polical unrest
and thus, soon banned this sort of activity. This custom, however, could not be uprooted. There are reports of
pilgrims from Henan being arrested in Peking between 1824-1834 (Hsiao: p. 231).
15 For an overview of the history of the Christian House Church movement in China see Barbara Nield, China´s
House Churches, in: Renewal Journal, No. 3/ 1994: p. 4860.*1
16 The ban was justified under the law prohibiting "disturbing public order". See Amnesty International. 1994b.
China: Protestants and Catholics detained since 1993. AI Index: ASA 17/06/94. *2
17 The members of the Jesus Family lead a communitarian life without central authority structures. They
practice their religion not in church buildings, but reserve an area in their houses for worshipping. Since they
also propagate economic self-sufficiency, they were partly beyond governmental control. They claim to have
reached high productivity in agriculture: Throughout the famine in 1942, they are said to have given 90% of
their harvest away for relief, while still being able to feed themselves. This is not the place to argue whether
we are here confronted with a episode in a long tradition of miracles or if this event really occured in the
described dimension. For a detailed account on the communitarian life of the founding community in
Shandong Province and a description of the measures adopted by the state, see also a report by Amnesty
International. 1994a. China. The imprisonment and harassment of Jesus Family members in Shandong
Province. AI Index: ASA 17/31/94.*3 Note also in this respect that public security agents usually blame
members for leading a “collective” life and, consequently, even prohibit common meals (Human Rights in
7by Jing Dianying in 1929 (other sources speak of 1920) in Shandong province, but soon
spread to Henan, where it has an unkown number of followers today. Lately, the arrest of Xu
Yongze and other leaders of his New Birth Church near the provincial capital of Zhengzhou
aroused international attention.18 Because Henan is also a base of operations for in particular
American missionaries, some of whom are in close contact with these Chinese sects, the
Chinese government has another reason to keep an eye on their activities.19
The last tradition we want to introduce leads us into the arena of organized "counter-
societies", whose means of operation and objectives are often illegal. In this category we
group all forms of religious-oriented secret societies and banditry.20 Early examples include
the "Yellow Turbans" (huangjin), a messianist movement of Daoist inspiration in the 2nd
century, and the "Red Turbans" (hongjin), a chiliastic movement awaiting the appearance of
the Buddha Maitreya (Milefo) in the 14th century. In recent centuries this province was a
major focal point of the "Sect of Heavenly Order" (tianlijiao), the White Lotus-sect21,
(bailianhui), the Nian-movement22, the "Heavenly Bamboo-movement (tianzhujiao), the
"Society of Elder Brothers" (gelaohui), the "Green and Red Guild" (qinghongbang), the
"Persistent Way" (yiguandao) -movement, the sect "Great King of Red Heaven" and the
"Society of the Great Sword" (dadaohui), just to mention the most important ones.
In general, these groups consisted of impoverished and uprooted peasants and emerged in
times of crisis. They were joined by demobilised soldiers and in modern times by
transportation workers. With the construction of two railway lines through Henan, quite a few
people in the transportation sector lost their jobs.23 Most of these secret societies promised
their members a heavenly state of happiness and tried to establish an egalitarian society built
on the principles of morality and higher justice.24 Often, they awaited the end of the world or
a sort of apocalypse as a prelude to a heavenly order.25 Howev r, they also resorted to illegal
                                                                                                                          
China. From China Rights Forum, Religion in China. Regulating the Opium of the People (New York),
Spring 1995.*4
18 The New Birth Church which was founded in the early 80s of this century, teaches that followers have to cry
for three days before being reborn as Christians. For more information see also the following newspaper
articles:
Cary Huang, Christian´s Arrest 'not Suppression', in: Hong Kong Standard, 24.06.1997*5; Daniel Kwan,
Church Leader 'to be released', in: SCMP, 09.06.1997*6; Daniel Kwan, Christian accused of Heresy, in:
SCMP, 24.06.1997.*7
19 Daniel Kwan, Security Agents stepping up to fight against Foreign Religious Activists, in: SCMP,
17.06.1997.*8
20 We do realize that in general there are differences between thes  two groups in objectives and in
organizational aspects. However, we refrain from elaborating on these differentiations due to space
considerations. Furthermore, reports and studies reveal that these two groups often intermingled and that the
line between them is not easy to draw.
21 For a long time the White Lotus sect threatened imperial control of rural Henan. As a result, 39 illegally built
temples were destroyed by government troops in 1893 alone (Hsiao: p. 233).
22 Elizabeth J. Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945, Stanford (Stanford University
Press) 1980: pp. 100-151.
23 In 1907 Alekseev (p. 209) also noted on his journey that the railroad from Kaifeng to Luoyang was being
built by a French-Belgian company. Furthermore, all staff in the train and in the trainstations were either
French or Belgian.
24 Lin Qing and Li Wencheng, two rebellion leaders of the beginning of the 19th century, provide a good
example of the rationale behind movements of this type: They introduced a system of graded membership
fees according to which land would later be assigned to group members should the rebellion succeed in
taking over control in a certain area (Hsiao: p. 471). Note in this respect also that, despite scarcity of land in
densely populated Henan, landownership in the western part of the province was distributed widely among
peasants (Hsiao: p. 407).
25 Jean Chesneaux, Weisser Lotus, Rote Bärte. Geheimgesellschaften in China. Zur Vorgeschichte der
Revolution, Berlin (Rotbuch) 1976; C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society, Taipei (SMC Publishing
8or violent measures such as confiscating grain or land from wealthy families and assaulting
public granaries. They referred to these actions as "food equalization" (jun liang).26
Robber bands also have a longstanding tradition in Henan. The province is still regarded as
"bandit-ridden".27 In particular, the tradition of the lülin, the so-called "Heroes of the Green
Forest" bands28, developed in Henan's poor western and southern areas. Robber bands were
often an expression of protest against suppression and injustice, and thus grew in number and
in size due to the impoverishment of the peasants and workers. Robber bands and secret
societies often got mixed up or the latter were controlled by bandits. The transition from
bandit to rebel was fluid, too, because rebels were officially branded as "bandits". This holds
particulary true during the period of peasant uprisings, which took place regularly in famine-
and-poverty stricken Henan. Henan was, to provide an example, the single focal area of the
uprisings in the late Ming dynasty of the 17th century. The primary reason for the rebellion
was the doubling of the land tax rate in the period from 1618-1636. Although the rebellion
started in 1627 in the neighbouring province of Shaanxi and the leaders all originated from
that province, the main activities shifted to Henan in 1633. Henan therefore played a central
role until the end of the rebellion in 1646.29 Peasant rebellions in the period between 1861-
1863 inflicted great damage to different parts of Henan. Consequently, as late as 1866 vast
areas of Henan remained devasted and depopulated.30 One of the latest prominent large-scale
peasant rebellions in Henan, however, occurred during the Sino-Japanese war in 1944, when
desperate starving peasants attacked Chinese troops and disarmed approximately 50,000
soldiers.31
The disposition towards autonomy and rebellion outlined above continued even after the
foundation of the People's Republic. In the early 50s Red Spears groups organized anti-
Communist activities. Between 1955-60 a movement based on the notion that an 18-year old
emperor had appeared who would save China from the Communists32 was obviously a
reaction of the peasantry to the enforced collectivization campaign and the Communist Party's
grip on the villages. As we already have demonstrated, Henan still belongs to the provinces
where secret societies and a variety of folk religious elements have the strongest impetus.33
Thus, it is not surprising that a report of the security authorities made in the early 90s also
concludes that Henan is one of the provinces where sects and secret societies are very active,
                                                                                                                          
Inc.)1994: pp. 220-222.; Jean Chesneaux, ed., Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950,
Stanford (Stanford University Press) 1972.
26 This term is cited in an imperial edict from 1835, regarding the activities of groups of "religious bandits"
(jiaofei) in Henan and other provinces (Hsiao:  pp. 200, 447).
27 Travelling through Henan in 1907 Alekseev (pp. 224-242), for example, noted in his diary that the
magistrates ordered soldiers to escort him and his travel companion to ensure a safe passage from one county
seat to another. He especially emphasized the poverty and the poor equipment of the soldiers who were
actually peasants and recruited only in times of unrest. Comp. as well Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries: pp.
62-64.
28 Odoric Y. K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses. Building Revolution in Henan, Stanford (Stanford University
Press) 1994: p. 15.
29 See Parsons: pp. 36, 244 and the introduction.
30 Hsiao: pp. 482.
31 The rebellion occured during a long period of terrible famine when the Chinese troops started requisition of
the peasants' property (Theodore E. White/Annalee Jacoby, Donner aus China, Hamburg et al. (Rowohlt)
1949: pp. 196-210.
32 Comp. Elizabeth J. Perry, Rural Violence in Socialist China, in: The China Quarterly, 103/1985: pp. 422-
424.
33 cf. eg. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 5-8-95 und 6-7-96.
9because they are "deeply rooted" and nourished by continuous conditions such as poverty and
superstition.34
5 The Political Dimension: History of a Revolutionary Model
5.1 The Collective Tradition
Henan’s history of natural calamities and economic, social and politic unrest led to the
development of extensive community-based security systems and fostered the collective
organization of hydraulic engineering and flood control. Although such forms of cooperation
are by no means confined to Henan, they nevertheless pervade community life in that area to a
special degree. As these actions take place in the public sphere, we consider them as
"political" in a broad sense. We do not consider here, however, measures undertaken by the
imperial administration such as large-scale canal building or the establishment of rural
granaries. Below, we discuss the existence of regular cooperation a) on the intra-village level
and b) the inter-village level: On the intra-village level peasants organized crop-watching
groups, which guarded crops before and during harvest times.35 To protect villages against
attacks of bandit groups, uprooted peasants and soldiers, local self-defence-groups, the
"village braves" (xiang yong), were organized. This holds true in particular for the mid-19th
century when the Nian rebellion ravaged the province. The "village braves" were also
responsible for surrounding villages with earth and brick walls, thus giving Henanese
settlements their martial appearence.36 Thes  groups later developed into a para-military
organizations which crossed village and even county borders. One of the numerous names
used for these groups was "Red spears" (hongqiang), to which their activities were later often
attributed. In section 5.3 of our paper we will come back to this topic, because the Red Spear
movement was still an important force during the Communist revolution. In addition,
cooperation between villages included flood control and irrigation projects because this was
vital to survival in that agrarian area.37
This pattern of collective organization proved all the more necessary as a result of the decay
of imperial order during the late Qing dynasty in the countryside. It thus substituted for
central administration, whose main function broadly was reduced to collecting taxes.38
Another crucial factor in the development of collectivism, was the transfer of central
government responsibilities to the provinces in 1891. In that year the Qing government
decided to place responsibility for the maintainance of the Yellow River water control in the
hands of localities. At the same time water control budgets were cut sharply in favour of
railroad funding construction, indemnity payments and the development of a modern army.39
                                         
34 Comp. special issue of Shengming Yu Zaihuo (Life and Disaster) on huidaomen (superstitious sects and
secret societies), December 1993: pp. 1-3.; 51-56.
35 Hsiao: p. 288.
36 Hsiao: 1960, pp. 296, 302.
37 Hsiao (p. 307) reports as a common example for that form of cooperation the dredging of a river by several
villages in the county of Henei in 1848.
38 In general the Qing government was aware of its esponsibility for the well-being of the peasants and, for
example, regarded famine relief of one of its major tasks. However, it depended on the ability and efficiency
of its agents, the magistrates. In the 19th century rural granaries (shecang) in Henan were by-and-large
neglected.
39 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Making of a Hinterland. State, Society, and Economy in Inland North China, 1853-
1937, Berkeley et al. (University of California Press) 1993: pp. 154-160.
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Though the central government neglected the Henan Yellow River, the provincial government
maintained up a relatively large budget for river-related work. The river ran and runs very
close to the provincial capital of Kaifeng, which was continually threatened by it, and through
the economic heart of the province. In addition, the railroad from North to South China passed
through a flood-prone area.40 The Yellow river water control was thus a permanent burden for
the mainly poor province. Referring to this situation, Henan’s governor Chen Kuilong
complained in 1905 that the central authorities' sharp cut in funds for Yellow River control
made inland provinces victims of a development strategy which emphasized the coastal
areas.41 This reproach continues to be made.
5.2 From Imperial China to the Republic of China
During the anti-imperial movements, when Chinese society was buffeted by fierce debates
about the political future and the course of development, Henan remained relatively
untouched by radical notions of modernity. Due to its relative seclusion in the hinterland it
was not similarly directly confronted with Western hegemonic challenges as for example the
coastal areas.42 Consequently, it did not develop such strong anti-foreign movements. Von
Richthofen notes on one of his journeys at that time:
"nowhere on earth does there exist a more good-natured race than inhabits the
province of Honan".43
Concerning Henan and Shaanxi von Richthofen also noticed the economic and social decay in
the last decades in the 19th century. To explain this situation he identified a combination of
factors, some of which are still relevant today: a) the Nian rebellion, b) periods of extreme
droughts, c) overpopulation, combined with a high unemployment rate and c) the widespread
consumption of opium.44
Henan's political elites were either co-opted by the Qing government or promoted moderate
political reforms. At that time other provinces including Hunan and Fujian and cities such as
Beijing and Shanghai were focal points for political activity and the birthplaces of prominent
reformers and vigorous revolutionaries. In contrast, Henan was the native province and power
base of Yuan Shikai, a high-ranking conservative military official in the imperial
administration, who became president of the new Chinese Republic, but later tried in vain to
promote himself as emperor.45 Yuan, who came from a great family of official-scholars and
                                         
40 Pomeranz: p. 205.
41 Cit. in Pomeranz: p. 162.
42 This is not intended to suggest that Western capitalist interventions did not affect Henan. Indeed, the import
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Luoyang and Kaifeng and thus contributed to further impoverishment of the inhabitants (Oskar Weggel,
Geschichte Chinas im 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart (Kröner) 1989: p. 14).
43 Von Richthofen: p. 26; cit. in Hsiao: p. 491.
44 Von Richthofen: p. 54, cit. in Hsiao: p. 399. In 1907 Alekseev on hi  visit to the grottes of Luoyang also
mentiones that nearly half of them were used as gambling and opium dens. A stone-carved edict in front of
the area revealed the helplessness of the local magistrate. It criticized this habit and provided notice of the
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involved in trading (Alekseev: p. 227).
45 Yuan's second power base was the neighbouring province of Zhili, where he served as governor-general in
the first decade of the 20th century (Chuzo Ichiko, The Role of the Gentry. An Hypothesis, in: China in
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military leaders, returned frequently throughout his life to his hometown for long visits. The
last three years before the founding of the Chinese Republic he lived in official retirement in
his home province, but still maintained contact with the court in Peking.46 Not surprisingly,
the Provincial Assembly of Henan was dominated by representatives of the old scholar-elite
and did not produce any outstanding speaker at the National Assembly.47
Chinese elites in Henan, however, made efforts to modernize the old-fashioned education
system, although not to the same extent as other provinces. As early as 1907 Luoyang, which
at that time was named Henanfu, had a modern school with a Western curriculum.48 In 1912
Zhongzhou University, later named Henan University, was established in Kaifeng
immediately after the government announced educational reforms. The choice of the old
metropolis as the location for the first modern higher education institution in the province,
provides another indication of the prominent place this city held until recently.49 During the
May-Fourth Movement on May 31, 1919, Kaifeng witnessed student demonstrations like
other cities in China. Although two representatives from Henan were also among the 11
delegates who constituted the Student Union of Republican China on July 16th, 1919 in
Shanghai, they did not play a prominent role in this movement as student leaders rather
emerged from Beijing, Shanghai and Hunan province.50
On the whole, Henan stayed at the periphery of the revolutionary processes that occured in
China. When the Wuchang uprising in 1911 finally put an end to the imperial era, Henan was
among the last provinces in China to declare itself independent from the former imperial
government.51 There was only one episode during this period in which Henan's tradition of
peasant rebellion acted with the modern political revolutionaries around Sun Yat-sen. In
1913-14 during the restoration under the presidency of Yuan Shikai, a rebel named Bai Lang
organized a revolt against Yuan Shikai in Henan and neighbouring provinces.52
5.3 The Pre-Revolutionary Development in Henan
During the warlord period Henan experienced more unrest and instability. By the mid-1930s,
however, Henan was primarily controlled by the nationalist government. Though an extensive
land reform was not the intention of the central government, a few experiments with a more
rational administration were launched. For example, in Northern Henan each county (xian)
was divided into districts (qu) which were led by a district head (quzhang). Certain features
                                                                                                                          
Revolution. The First Phase 1900-1913, ed. by Mary Claubaugh Wright, New Haven et al. (Yale University
Press) 1968: p. 303).
46 See Arthur W. Hummel ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period, Taipei (Ch’eng Wen Publishing) 1970
(orig. publ. in 1843): pp. 949-953.
47 The representatives from the Provincial Assembly of Henan in the National Assembly demonstrated a strong
affilation to the high-ranking gentry. As against the other provinces, Henan held the highest proportion in
metropolitian degree holders (jinshi), and did not send any non-gentry representative. (P’eng-yüan Chang,
The Constitutionalists, in: China in Revolution. The First Phase 1900-1913, ed. by Mary Claubaugh Wright,
New Haven et al. (Yale University Press) 1968: p. 152. In the National Assembly, however, the most
prominent and eloquent leaders all came from the lower gentry and had studied abroad (Chang: pp. 153-155).
48 Alekseev: p. 222.
49 Qu: p. 22; Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement. Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, Stanford
(Stanford University Press) 1960: p. 48.
50 Chow: pp. 131, 144, 164.
51 See for a detailed account Ichiko: pp. 304-307. Henan joined in the revolution late, primarily because of the
strong position of the Manchu governor. Assembleymen also attempted to make contact with the
Revolutionary Government in Wuchang (Chang: p. 179).
52 Chesneaux 1976: pp. 155-156.
12
were required for the post of the district head. These officials were required to a) be at least
thirty years old, b) have a middle school degree and c) graduate from a school of
administration in the provincial capital. This was intended to establish the foundation for an
effective and responsible administration.53 The ationalist government also encouraged the
organization of peasants in different types of co-operatives, which the government claimed
were widely accepted in the provinces of Central China.54
One ambitious goal of the nationalist government was the rapid modernization of the whole
country. Employing electrification as measured by the number of registered power companies
to assess the degree of development, in 1934 Henan was tied with Suiyan for 14th place in the
field of 16 provinces. Because most modern technologies were concentrated in a few urban
and industrial centers, the vast countryside was still untouched by the modernization drive.55
However, within the urban-industrial areas the processes of change were clearly having an
effect. In the 20s a strong trade union movement developed, in which Communists gained
certain influence, particulary among railway workers.56 This movement peaked with the large
strike of the Peking-Hankou railway workers in 1923. During this strike the workers tried to
force the establishment of a central trade union federation. The immediate cause of the strike
was the forcible dissolution of the railway workers' congress by local military forces in the
city of Zhengzhou, today's capital of Henan. The dissolved congress had intended to establish
such a central trade union federation. Instead, the local military succeeded in crushing the
strike movement with armed force and prevented the foundation of the federation. The
existing trade unions were driven underground.57 At that time the Communists in general
played still a marginal role in the trade union movement.
Much more important for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were the developments in the
rural areas. The large-scale land-holding structures in the eastern part of the province with
their corresponding forms of exploitation stimulated the peasants' movement during this
period. In the mid-20s, 270,000 peasants were said to be organized in peasants' organizations
as well as 100,000 in self-organized peasants' militias. Peasant movements existed in 20
counties. Henan was said to have had the second largest peasant movement of all provinces.
As previously mentioned, the peasants' movement from 1920-30 was represented by the
society of the "Red Spears" (hongqianghui), a movement which combined religious and
military elements. Originating from a rural self-defence force against bandits, it evolved, in
reaction to rural impoverishment resulting from natural disasters and constantly increasing
taxes and duties to the warlords (so-called "military-rates"), into a resistance movement
against the warlords and their subordinated district chiefs.58
                                         
53 Reconstruction in China. A Record of Progress and Achievement in Facts and Figures, with Illustrations and
Maps (China Today Series, 3), ed. by Tang Leang-Li, Shanghai (China United Press) 1935: p. 5.
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55 Reconstruction in China: p.66.
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The Communists used these associations and their organizational structures to gain influence
in Henan. In 1926-27 the CCP sent cadres from Henan back to their hometowns to organize
the Red Spear Society into peasants' associations and at the same time to win their support for
the intended Northern Expedition. This was indeed successful so that on the arrival of the
military units of the Northern Expedition thousands of peasants rose against the warlords in
Henan among other places. Thus the Party gained important, positive, practical experience in
organizing the peasantry.
Wou points out that the conversion of millenarian movements into revolutionary forces is
very difficult, because ideology, rituals and organizational structures differ considerably. It
should also be noted that the Red Spears as part of the traditional defense system in East
Henan largely relied on kinship and community relationships. Thus, they were led by
members of the local gentry, were based on patron-client relationships and represented broad
local interests.59
Nevertheless, in many places the Communists succeeded in infiltrating the Red Spears and in
converting them into peasant associations. Where Red Spear associations were led by
members of the gentry, the conversion process was much more difficult. In response to the
initiation of social reforms by the peasant associations, the leaders of the Guomindang
ordered the cessation of all mass movements and the arrest of 300 Communists in Henan in
1927. The peasant movement disintegrated and the remaining Communists retreated into rural
areas or into the mountains. The extend to which the Communists and chiefs of the Red
Spears were connected is reflected in the following example:
"Before they finally dispersed, twenty Communist cadres and Red Spears chiefs went
through a solemn ritual ceremony in a Christian church, a practice common among Red
Spears in times of crisis, in which they swore to uphold the cause and to remain faithful
as brothers till death."60
It is not possible to establish direct continuity provable from the Red Spears to the
Communist movement. However, the cooperation between the movements left its mark on the
Henan communists as well as on the local peasantry involved. In 1926 some students from
Henan and the Red Spear leaders took part in courses at the Peasant Training Institute in
Guangzhou and later formed the core of cadres in the anti-Japanese resistance in Henan. Parts
of the self-defense corps founded in the twenties operated from the communist bases in Henan
and later were integrated into the New Fourth Army. Some of the networks were also still
operational and were put to good use during the anti-Japanese war. Wou argues that
continuity existed in terms of both leadership and mobilization capabilities.61
Revolutionary bases were established in the course of the retreat of the Henan communists
into rural areas. In Henan there were six such areas, mainly crossing provincial borders: Yu-E
(Henan/Hubei), Eyuwan (Hubei/Henan/Anhui), Yuwansu (Henan/Anhui/Jiangsu), Sui-Qi-Tai
(Suixian, Qixian, Taikang counties in eastern Henan), Yuxi (West Henan) and in the Taihang
Mountains.62 The most important and best documentated one was the Eyuwan Soviet Area.
                                                                                                                          
members of this association considered themselves to be invulnerable. See Roman Slawinski, The Red
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59 Wou: pp. 51-53.
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61 Wou: p. 97.
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Apart from Jinggangshan, Eyuwan was the largest Soviet base between 1927-1934 and it was
of central importance as it was strategically well-situated. The competition between
Jinggangshan in Jiangxi and Eyuwan resulted in the conflict between Mao Zedong and Zhang
Guotao, the leader of Eyuwan.63
Eyuwan had 3.5 mio inhabitants who were either killed or lost to the movement in the course
of Chiang Kai-shek's "surrounding and destruction campaigns". In 1932 the leadership of that
area was forced to evacuate the base of Eyuwan. A small group of experienced cadres led by
Xu Haidong remained at Eyuwan to continue Communist propaganda and organizational
work in the underground. Only during the anti-Japanese resistance movement did the
Communist guerilla forces became stronger, particularly in the mountains of Henan. The
Japanese intention to transform Henan into a center for cotton production for their own use
helped to mobilize the peasants' support for the CCP.64 T us in 1944 the local units of the Red
Army in Henan included about 100,000 people as well as some 200,000 peasant militamen.65
5.4 The Development After the Founding of the PRC
The Communist government in the early fifties moved the provincial capital from Kaifeng to
Zhengzhou, which soon developed from a railroad juncture and a small city to a major
industrial hub. By establishing Zhengzhou as the capital of the province in 1954, the
leadership emphasized its objectives for the province. They chose a new, socialist city,
dominated by the modern industrial sector to undermine the orientation to the old historio-
cultural centers and embody the spirit of the new age. As the result of construction of
colleges, universities and research institutes in the new provincial capital, Kaifeng lost its old
position as the cultural center of the province, though Henan University remained there.
Luoyang and Anyang also were patterned after the Communist notion of development and
built up as industrial production bases. This development, however, did not lead to a
comprehensive modernization, but produced great intra-provincial socioeconomic disparities,
which still exist.
In the countryside several attempts were made to reshape rural life from the ground up. Below
we address the major campaigns that occured in the Maoist era. We will demonstrate how the
historical disposition towards egalitarism and communitarism facilitated the introduction of
certain radical agrarian policies before we turn to the rural policies adopted in the Deng era.
Originally, the land reform in Henan was intended to proceed at a moderate pace. Party
documents warned against revolutionary impetousness, and Deng Zihui, the propaganda chief
of the army, declared shortly before the foundation of the People's Republic, that not land
reform but, "bandit suppression, equitable taxes, and a settling of accounts with the bullies"
were the main tasks of Party work in Henan. Only a small minority of people should be
committed to class struggle.66 This cautionary note reflected that the CCP in Henan at that
time had not yet consolidated its power. The earlier support of Party organizations by
reformist gentry and liberal rich peasants may also have played a role. As early as in the
thirties, the relationship between the Party and the gentry had required a specific policy and
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had made the implementation of a land reform program quite difficult.67 This moderate
position, however, was criticized later and the land reform in Henan became extremely
violent. Wu Zhipu, later Party Secretary of Henan, was responsible for its implementation.68
Not only landlords, but also rich- and middle-class peasants were stripped of all their
property, to include movable property. Beatings and murders were widespread. The term "rich
peasants" was interpreted so broadly that many middle-class peasants were included in the
category.69
The First Five-Year Plan and massive central support led to considerable industrial growth
relative to agricultural improvements.70 Although the agrarian sector was to be stabilized by
large-scale irrigation projects, planning encouraged the industrial sector at the expense of
agriculture. With the increase of collectivization, the role of Henan as a grain base and the
control over the rural areas and the peasantry were intended to be strengthened, particularly
as, despite the transformation of the villages into co-operatives, the gross output value of
agriculture was not much higher than in the first year of the Five-Year Plan (1953: 3.154
billion Yuan, 1957: 3.57 billion Yuan).71
In each of the collectivization movements Henan was more or less a revolutionary model. As
in other parts of the country, lower-level co-operatives were established in 1955 and higher-
level ones in 1956. By the end of 1956 99.4 percent of the peasant households in the province
were organized in co-operatives, 98.7 percent of them in higher-level ones at the behest of the
provincial Party leadership.
1956 was a year of heavy losses in the agrarian sector. Collectivization destroyed the
peasants' initiative and undermined their ability and authority to make necessary decisions
regarding cultivation and tilling. Party meddling in agrarian practices had lasting
consequences. Harvest yields and the number of cattle decreased or stagnated almost
everywhere. The reduction in the number of permitted private activities and trade that occured
in the course of the collectivization made it impossible for the peasants to switch to non-
agrarian sectors. There were bottlenecks and supply problems in many fields. The incomes of
the peasants decreased dramatically. These difficulties were increased by extremely bad
weather conditions and flooding. Tens of thousands of people migrated from the starvation
areas of Henan to Northwest China and other central Chinese provinces.
The chaos in agriculture and the beginning of the Hundred-Flower-Movement required a
liberalization of the rural policy in Henan. Large numbers of peasants withdrew from the co-
operatives.72 Henan's Party Secretary Pan Fusheng understood the difficulties caused by over-
large co-operatives and understood why the peasants chose to leave them. He criticized cadres
for forcing the peasants into higher and higher forms of collective organization. Pan was
reported to have expressed that the main contradiction in the countryside were not the
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contradictions between capitalist and socialist tendencies, but rather "between willingness and
unwillingness of the peasants to produce". He believed Henan differed from Peking and
Shanghai and would have to adopt a suitable policy to reflect these differences. The on-going
call for class struggle in Pan 's view was directed against the wrong people, for example the
middle-class peasants. In addition he opposed the country-wide movement against the "rural
rightists" in 1957. For voicing these opinions he was later criticized and dismissed during the
Great Leap Forward. He was accused of exaggerating the difficulties of the co-operatives, of
attempting to turn back the process of collectivization and of denying the superiority of
collective farming.73
In the political campaigns Henan was also in the forefront. The Anti-Hu-Feng-Movement of
1955, which was primarily directed against intellectuals, was carried out very rigorously in
Henan and led to the replacement of all the chairmen of the local writers unions. During the
Sufan-Movement for the eradication of hidden counterrevolutionaries in 1955-56, "only"
5,770 persons were arrested according to official statements. The number of people who were
questioned and criticized was nevertheless considerable: 600,000 people were affected by the
movement, 200,000 letters of denunciation were received, and 80,000 people had to admit
their mistakes.74 Because mainly urban intellectuals and "democratic personalities" were
targeted, although the urban population at that time stood between 3.7 and 4.4 mio people, the
rate of people involved was extremely high.
During the Anti-Rightist-Campaign, Henan was again one of the most active provinces. Here
the fight against the "Rightists" lasted longest, until June, 1958, and the number of 60,000
Rightists "discovered" there was, in proportion to the total population, higher than in all the
other provinces. Although, according to official statements, only 5,115 persons were finally
declared "Rightists", 200,000 were targeted in this movement. Once more the victims were
primarily intellectuals and other urban inhabitants. Domenach reports that at least 15,000
people were punished in one way or the other.75
Henan's radical character persisted in the movements to establish People's Communes and
during the "Great Leap Foreward" (1958-60). In January, 1958, the provincial Party
Committee decided to irrigate and drain all the cultivable land, a step which required
enormous mobilization of collective labour; to completely root out the "Four Basic Evils",
consisting of flies, mosquitos, mice and sparrows; and to double or even triple the per-mu
grain output. As against 1957, the last year of the First Five-Year Plan, it was planned that the
gross industrial output of local industry at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan (1962) would
increase by 22 times and gross agricultural output by 45 times. It was also planned that steel
output would increase from 4,000 tons to 5 mio tons (!) and grain yields from 11.8 mio tons to
100 mio tons. These projected figures were increased again at the beginning of 1959. The
ownership of the people's communes were to be transferred into state property within that
period.76
The various production units outdid each other with false and exaggerated "success"
announcements. The Statistical Bureau of the province was put under the propaganda
department of the provincial Party Committee. Not surprisingly, the success-reports
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continued. The Henan Daily reported in September, 1958 that daily production of steel in
Henan amounted to 28,000 tons. This would have required an increase from 4,000 tons in
1957 to 10.22 mio tons in 1958. In October, 1958, the prefecture of Xinxiang alone was said
to have produced 1.2 mio tons of steel per day. This amount was equivalent to 438 mio tons
yearly. The Heping people's commune in Xiping county reported a per-mu wheat output of
7,320 Jin in July, 1958.77
In August, 1958, Mao visited the Qiliying people's commune in Xinxiang county, where the
first collective farm had already been founded, and is reported to have made his famous
remark "people's communes are good". A few months before, the first people's commune,
Weixing or "Sputnik" in English, had been established in Henan's Suiping prefecture. Henan
was the first province to implement Mao's concept of rapid socialization, thus showing the
practicality of this concept and advancing to the "Holy Land of the People's Commune
Movement".78
After Mao openly approved of the establishment of people's communes combining industry,
agriculture, trade, education and defense functions, Henan was the first province to begin
establishing such communes on a province-wide basis in August, 1958. At the same time an
egalitarian remuneration for all commune members was introduced. At the end of only one
month (September, 1958), all peasant households in Henan were organized in communes.
The establishment of people's communes here first, was at that time attributed to Henan's
particular need for collective services, including the development of a functioning irrigation
system in the catchment area of the Yellow River both for irrigation and for drainage, as well
as provisions of common protection measures against natural disasters.79 The probl m these
two sets of collective services were intended to address were especially important in
providing impetus to the establishment of communes because several times between 1956-
1958, Henan barely managed to escape from flood disasters only by collective large-scale
operations. In addition, the provincial leadership believed a large and well organized
irrigation system would result in a significant increase in grain yields and thus improve the
status of the province. Though Henan was China's leading grain producer, it only reached
self-sufficiency. The Party Committee argued accordingly: "If we got the problem of water
conservancy straightened out, we could expect a wheat production increase of 1,000 percent".
But the implementation would require extensive efforts on county and town level.80 At he
same time people's communes facilitated control of the rural population and thus the
consolidation of Party power.
Henan was on the forefront not only in establishing rural, but also in founding urban
communes. The first urban commune in China was developed in Zhengzhou.81 Salaff argues,
that this city had just been industrialized and that the workers therefore still had a strong
agrarian background. The labor-force consisted mainly of worker-peasant migrants who had
tried to superimpose their traditional rural ideas of collectivism on the city.82
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In August, 1958, 173 urban communes existed in Henan and the province was the principal
center of experiment. The majority of the urban population was quickly organized in such
communes. Due to inefficiency and the lack of requisite physical materials they were
abolished after a short period.83
Henan was among the last provinces to restrict the "Communist wind" of the Great Leap, to
give up the canteens in which the peasants had been forced to have common meals84 and, at
the beginning of the sixties, to reduce the scope of the people's communes. This was certainly
supported by the climate of fear which arose after Wu Zhipu became 1st Party Secretary of
the province.
As early as 1958 Henan had experimented with paying wages according to work performed
and free distribution of goods.85 In the September 16, 1958 issue of Hongqi (Red Flag), the
theoretical organ of the CCP, the Party Secretary of Henan described the practices of his
province with respect to the free distribution of goods. Some communes provided their
members with, for example, free rice and meals, others had provided, apart from free food,
free clothes and lodgings as well as free services such as medical care, education etc. In still
others, members were provided with free fuel, haircuts, and cultural events.86
The campaign against the critics of the "Great-Leap-policy" went a lot further in Henan than
in other provinces. However, Henan paid acting as a model with the highest starvation rate in
the country. Henan continued to report fantastic new economic successes to Peking, even after
hundreds of thousands had starved and although in some cases entire villages were
depopulated. In Suiping county, nearly 30% of the population in Chayashan people's
commune, one of the first communes, starved by the end of 1960.87 Official figures reflect the
population in Henan declined by 1.2 mio in 196088. Chen Yizi, former adviser of Zhao
Ziyang, mentions a decline of 7.8 mio.89
A real holocaust occured in Xinxiang prefecture, where the local leadership declared war on
the peasants. A regime of terror held sway. House-to-house searches were conducted in order
to confiscate all the peasants foodstuffs to the end of reporting record outputs. Any hint of
criticism or dissent and any suspicion of hiding food or of holding "Rightist" views was
penalized by severe beating, killing or torture. In that prefecture alone hundreds of thousand
people are presumed to have either starved, to have been executed or to have died from
torture. Cannibalism was widespread. Aid relief from central authorities was rejected by the
local leadership because the prefecture was still reporting record harvests. The situation was
so critical that in 1961 30,000 PLA-soldiers occupied the prefecture and brought an end to the
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terror and starvation. 130,000 local cadres were investigated and ordered "to reform their
work-style". Only a few of them were punished.90
In 1959 many of the hungry peasants spontaneously returned to family cultivation. This
development was often tolerated or even had to be tolerated by local Party officials. However,
in the very same year those peasants were criticized by the provincial Party leadership as
"Right-Opportunists".91 As a result of the famine, criminality and activities directed against
the Party increased noticeably. In 1960, the local press reported that guerilla forces organized
by peasants numbered up to 10,000 people. They stormed grain stores and distributed grain to
the hungry peasants.92
In, 1961 Wu Zhipu was degraded to 2nd Party Secretary. He was accused of having cheated
the Party Center by falsifying reports with fictitious successes. Wu's successor as provincial
Party Secretary, Liu Jianxun, harshly criticized Wu for having ruthlessly and brutally
persecuted all sceptics and opponents of the Great Leap Forward and for accusing them of
being "Right-Opportunists". Nobody was out of constant danger and "fathers and mothers,
husbands and wifes had not dared to talk to each other".93 Liu Jianxun tried to oriente
agriculture more to cash-crops such as peanuts and to provide the peasants and the province
with new opportunities to raise their income. Consequently, at the beginning of the Cultural
Revolution, he was accused of having neglected the cultivation of grain and thus the welfare
of the whole country in favor of profit.94
To invigorate Henan's economy, a conference of Henan's provincial secretaries, led by Tao
Zhu, the 1st Secretary of the Central-South Bureau, was conducted at Zhengzhou in April,
1962. The conference issued a "Six-Year Plan for Recovering and Developing Agriculture in
Henan". Among other things it contemplated the introduction of household output quotas, the
distribution of land by contract and the lease of collective land. Under this plan, private use of
up to 20 % of the arable land was possible. For a short time Henan became a sort of
experimental province for the sanzi yi bao. Under this policy more plots for private use, more
free markets and more enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profit or loss were
planned. In addition, output quotas on a household basis were fixed. Sanzi yi bao was later
criticized as "revisionist".95
Yet quite soon the provincial leadership was again praised for its revolutionary eagerness.
During the "Socialist Education Movement" in 1964-65 the province attracted positive
attention for having successfully overcome capitalism and feudalism and for having raised the
class consciousness of the peasantry.96 Henan had especially well-mastered the "struggle
between the two roads" and had given "all the power to the poor and lower-middle peasants".
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The local cadres opposition to the "leftist" line of the provincial leadership must have been
considerable. In the latter half of 1964 at least 23% of all basic-level cadres in Henan were
reported to have been attacked and about 10% were reported to have been dismissed, expelled
from the Party, or similarly punished.97
The Cultural Revolution was initiated with the first big-character poster campaign at Peking
University, Zhengzhou University and other universities in Henan in June, 1966. As in earlier
campaigns, Henan carried out the Cultural Revolution and its different campaigns relatively
violently. Mao had many times commended Henan and said in October, 1966: "Only Henan
has the character 'boldness' in mind, the majority have the character 'fear' in mind".98 Some of
the most active critics of the "top Party leaders in authority" came from Henan. This criticism,
among many others, resulted, for example, in the arrest and probably also the subsequent
death of Liu Shaoqi in prison in Kaifeng.
Bloody armed clashes occurred shortly after the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. A
January, 1968 issue of the Henan Ribao reported that "local chieftains" had organized their
own guerilla forces, which were "gathering recruits, reoccupying mountainous areas, using
mountain caves as headquarters, and sallying forth to make armed raids." These forces were
reported to have kidnapped soldiers and stolen military equipment as well as to have
provoked armed clashes with members of the military forces. These activities presumably
were directed against representatives of the Cultural Revolution and led to a state of "armed
anarchism" in the province.99 As early as February, 1967, Zhou Enlai ordered the military
forces to stamp out the bloody clashes involving guerilla forces in Henan. In May, the
fighting flared up again, mainly in Kaifeng and Luoyang where it took on the appearance of a
civil war.
After the Revolutionary Committee of Henan province was established in 1968 and after the
Red Guards had been driven from political life, the situation obviously reversed itself. Thus
the Red Guards were reported to have retreated to the mountains for "armed struggle".100
Between October, 1973 and April, 1974 180,000 Cultural-Revolutionary activists were
admitted to the Party and 66,000 Cultural-Revolutionary cadres were promoted. In both
categories Henan had higher numbers than the other provinces. This may have been an
important reason why the campaign against the "evil wind" (sha yaofeng) developed here
most violently and lasted longest. For example, in 1975 ultra-leftist forces in the Party center
and in the provincial leadership started a new country-wide campaign against "revisionist
tendencies" by citing the 1973 suicide of a middle school pupil in Tanghe county. This pupil
had been criticised by her teacher for expressing opposition to foreign language courses on an
English exam sheet. The explanation given for the first broadcast of an English language
course by Radio Zhengzhou also demonstrated the political thinking of that time. The new
language program was introduced as a means to "arm the listeners with an international
proletarian and patriotic spirit, and to help them master foreign languages in order to
propagate Marxism-Leninism and Maozedong-Thought and to anchor the revolutionary line
of Chairman Mao in diplomacy."101
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Like other provinces, Henan faced in 1975-76 a serious economic crisis. Official statements
reflect that agricultural output, industrial output and financial income were 7.1%, 19.5% and
32.7% lower in 1976, respectively, than in 1975.102 Many enterprises were no longer able to
pay wages and salaries to their employees. Discontent expressed itself for instance in the
unrest of April, 1976, which spread from Peking to Zhengzhou. Like in other provinces,
peasants spontaneously returned to family cultivation. Rural poverty and supply problems left
the population with little choice. Return of the peasants to family cultivation began first in
Anhui, Sichuan and Henan, although the provincial Party leadership in Henan at first opposed
this development.103
In Henan the purge of supporters of the Gang of Four and the implementation of the centrally
agreed upon reform policy was very difficult. It was regarded as one of the most heavily-
disputed provinces during the Cultural Revolution and one of the Cultural Revolutionary
strongholds. Henan's connections to the Gang of Four were very strong. During a meeting
Henan's Party Secretary once promised "mutual support" to Jiang Qing. Each key position in
the province had been filled with adherents to the Cultural Revolution. After his second
dismissal in the spring of 1976, Deng and his followers were attacked here extremely
heavily.104 The most famous propaganda film of the Gang of Four "Counterattack" was
produced here and shown to the public. Some reports indicate that it had an "extremely bad
influence" on Henan, and caused "great harm" to the population.105 In the course of the
Cultural Revolution the Party organizations had been purged of old members and been
occupied by young "Cultural Revolutionaries". Thus a clientelist relationship had developed,
which made basic changes in the province more difficult. As the Renmin Ribao reported at the
beginning of 1979, "several rounds of intense struggle" were necessary to crush the power of
the extensive clientelist alliances.106 R istance against vigorous actions in Henan existed
even in Peking. Two members of the "Little Gang of Four", who had been dismissed at the
beginning of the 80s, had started their carreers in Henan. Wu De had been Party Secretary of
Pingyuan (a new created province that included part of Northern Henan) which was an
independent province from 1950-52 and then reunited with Henan. Ji Dengkui had been Party
Secretary of Xuchang107 and Luoyang prefectures in the 50s. From 1966-71 Ji was a member
of the secretariat of the provincial Party Committee. In 1968, he became Vice-Chairman of
the provincial Revolutionary Committee. From 1971-73 Ji was Secretary of the Party
Committee in addition to his position in the Center as an alternate from 1969-73. From 1973-
80 he was a full member of the Politburo of the CCP.108
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These factors made it impossible to conduct thorough purges in Henan at that time. In 1978
the Party leadership of Henan was finally replaced, first, because no careful purges had been
carried out, second, because reforms were implemented only half-heartedly, and finally,
because no measures against the most urgent problems of the people had been taken. For
example, the effects of the flood of 1975 had not been solved by the end of 1978.
Additionally the provincial leadership had failed to provide the inhabitants of the disaster
areas with a minimum of food. Therefore at the end of 1978 Radio Henan criticized: "Not
much has been done for those people living in great poverty, therefore the masses are
extremely discontent".109 At the same time it was reported that the Party Committee of a
prefecture, which was very much affected by flood disasters, was accused to have embezzled
103 mio $ from the flood relief funds.110
Liu Jianxun, who was Party Secretary from 1961-66 and from 1971-78, was dismissed from
the provincial People's Congress in 1980 for "grave errors and crimes". In 1983 Geng
Qicheng, Secretary of the Party Committee from 1971-77, was sentenced to jail for three
years for "concealing crime" during his period of office111 and n 1978 vice-Party Secretary
Wang Weichu was arrested for illegal activities.112
In October, 1978, complaints were still heard regarding the considerable difficulties of
eradicating the followers of the Gang of Four in Henan.113 In July, 1979, Henan Ribao
reported that supporters of the Gang of Four retained their positions in one quarter of all Party
and administration units at the provincial level.114 Only in August, 1981, according to Renmin
Ribao, had the Cultural Revolution in Henan been overcome and brought to an end.115
Apparently the R nmin Ribao spoke too soon as in March, 1982, Radio Henan again reported
the dismissal of Cultural Revolutionary officials, who had not changed their point of view.116
Thereafter, criticism of "leftist" tendencies continued.117 For example during the IVth Party
conference of the CCP of Henan in August, 1984, it was reported that many units neglected
the purge of Cultural Revolutionary climbers.118 Current reports still note opposition by
cadres against far-reaching economic reforms in the province.
This opposition is also reflected in the attitude adopted towards decollectivization and the
land question. In general, rural reforms in Henan relied on an egalitarian modus vivendi. Our
own observations in that respect are further confirmed by empirical data gathered in a study
undertaken in 1994 in 80 villages in the provinces of Zhejiang, Henan, Jilin and Jiangxi. This
modus vivendi usually comprises a distribution of land on an equal basis regardless of gender,
age and number of work points in the former collective system and provided for regular terms
of redistribution of land to adjust for demographical changes. The authors of the study also
point out that land transfer rights were most tightly controlled in Jiangxi and Henan and that
in both provinces governments retain the strongest grip on the land in general. They argue that
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scarcity of land and low productivity are the main reasons for the egalitarian policies.119
However, we would also like to direct the reader's attention to the long tradition of
egalitarianism prevailing in Henan which also explains these land policies. Henan also still
widely practices the system of "township cadres being responsible for villages" (xianggan bao
cun zhi), which implies that villages are still under the control of higher authorities despite the
central government's promises to give them greater autonomy.
A change for the better occurred only at the beginning of the nineties when Hou Zongbin,
who had been sent by the Party center in Peking, became Party Secretary. We therefore argue
that during this period Henan finally ceased to be the conservative communist hegemonic
model. Hou had extensive experiences in various provinces. He appointed a younger and
more professional staff of cadres. He was quite successful in Henan as Party Secretary, one
reason why he might have been promoted to Deputy Secretary of the CCP Central Discipline
Inspection Commission in October, 1992. In December, 1992, his deputy, Governor Li
Changchun, assumed the Party Secretary position in Henan. Henanese intellectuals, however,
are said to be suspicious of the Central Government's good intentions towards their province.
They coverty accuse the Central authorities of hindering the provincial development and
preventing Henanese politicians from building strong leadership positions in the provincial
government.120
However, even today the despotism and arbitrariness of the cadres in Henan is extremely
marked. In 1988 the Nongmin Ribao reported that the relationship between the cadres and the
masses was very tense, and that there was little chance of defending oneself against the cadres
misuse of their positions. The local implementation of edicts from the central government
afforded the cadres the opportunity to exert dictatorial-like power. On one occasion, for
example, a document from Peking ordered the cadres to convince the peasants of the necessity
of selling higher grain quotas to the state. According to the newspaper, village cadres in turn
posted a sign at the office of the village's Party committee that read: "The children of peasants
who are not able to raise the grain buying quota are not allowed to go to school. Those
peasants will get no permission for births and the land they got by contract will be
withdrawn".121 Poverty, the despotism of the cadres and corruption increased the potential for
protest, which had, as has been mentioned above, always been very strong. In a 1991 report of
the State Council, Henan was classified as a province which is politically and socially
unstable and in which protest actions could be expected from time to time.122 Henan is also
among the provinces where the rate of organized crime was highest in the first half of the
nineties.123
5.5 Outlining Henan's economic development
Although Henan follows the general path of reform, implementation of some reform steps
seems to be more difficult than in many other provinces. Certainly this holds also true for the
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whole of Central China. As late as 1998 China Daily cited Chinese economists who argued
that "Central China must still break free of the shackles of the old economic structure", in this
context referring to the centrally planned economy.124 That is true for example of the reform
of the ownership system. Like the state-owned sector all over China, enterprises in Henan
entered a period of crisis at the beginning of the 80s. Due to technological backwardness and
low quality standards most of Henan's enterprises could not compete with enterprises of the
coastal areas. Therefore the crisis in Henan was particularly strong. In 1995 alone, 57 out of
177 state enterprises were closed or partly closed in Kaifeng, one of the provinces major
industrial centers. In the textile sector 12 out of 14 enterprises were shut down. The factories
were unable to pay wages and guarantee social welfare for the majority of the workers. This
erosion of the state sector was decisive for the rapid growth of the non-state sector. In 1995
alone the latter already produced 68 % of the province's gross industrial output.125 Private
sector development in Henan was above the national average: Between 1992 and 1997 the
entire nation's private sector (individual and private enterprises) increased approximately 84.2
% (enterprises) and 151.6 % (labourers), but only about 132.2 and 168.5 %, respectively, in
Henan.126 In the latter the number of individual enterprises (getihu, with less than 8
employees) increased from 420,000 with 570,000 workers and staff (1983) to 1.80 mio with
3.232 mio workers and staff (1997), that of private enterprises (siying qiy, with more than 7
employees) from 3,467 with 58,000 persons (1987) to 34,203 with 484,840 persons (1997).127
The impetus for official support of private sector development was labour-force pressure,
especially from rural areas (as a result of the return to family farming and the related surplus
of labour in agriculture). This factor is particularly strong in Henan, where a larger share of
the labour force is engaged in the agricultural sector than in many other provinces. In 1996
one third of all counties were regarded as "poor counties". The provincial government,
lacking the necessary investment capital, is not able to establish a large-scale government-
funded anti-poverty program. The private sector is also expected to contribute to the reduction
of provincial poverty. Moreover, unemployment due to the erosion of state-owned sector and
lack of capital for restructuring the existing enterprises convinced the provincial leadership to
support the private economy. As the number of large enterprises in Henan is rather small and
state-owned enterprises are mainly labor-intensive small and medium-sized, the provincial
government opted to privatize most of those enterprises. Thus, the provincial government
followed the lead of the central government. by the summer 1998, 1,496 out of 2,157 small
and medium-sized state enterprises were privatized both through outright sale and renting-out.
Others were closed or merged with larger operations.128 P ivatization and shutting down state
run enterprises led to a significant increase in unemployment.129 Accordi g to the People's
Daily in May 1997 the state-owned sector had only about 4 mio employees, out of which
800,000 were counted as "surplus labourers" and 350,000 were already "set free".130 Due to
labour pressure in 1992 the provincial government established a program for promoting the
"bottom-up" development of the private sector in order to support the establishment of
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enterprises by citizens. Areas of business were extended, administrative procedures simplified
and distinctive measures to promote that sector were decided. The provincial document
containing these resolutions also sought to support the development of the private economy in
poor counties, where in 1996 roughly a quarter of the private sector was already
concentrated.131
However, the resistance from within the bureaucracy was remarkably strong. The different
positions and attitudes resulted in political ups and downs. On one occasion a pronouncement
was made that the private sector was too big and should be restricted. On another occasion it
was pronounced it was too small and should be developed and enhanced. In 1996 officials
continued to declare that private enterprises in Henan should proceed towards "mixed-
ownership enterprises" (hunhe suoyouzhi), i. e. towards enterprises with mixed private and
non-private ownership shares.132 Such uncertainties had the effect of inhibiting
entrepreneurial reinvestment chosing instead to consume their profit.133
As the breakdown of many state-owned enterprises and the resulting increase in
unemployment caused social conflict, local governments within Henan attempted to develop
the private economy by all means, even with the help of patterns of a planned economy. Our
research findings from Luohe city in 1996, for example, demonstrate that the local authorities
ordered a 20 % development of the private sector each year. Under a special program, 100
private enterprises with a turnover of at least 1 mio Yuan would be established or developed
every year. The  responsible officials were assigned fixed quotas in order to attain that
objective. Payment of boni was correlated to fulfillment of these quotas. To receive boni
payment officials eagerly convinced or forced smaller entrepreneurs to establish larger
enterprises. Not a few of these "new establishments" failed due to lack of know-how, capital,
technology or market information. Even if the enterprises went bankrupt the responsible
officials had fulfilled their quotas. Meanwhile, the provincial government had been
establishing four industrial belts cutting across the province from east to west and north to
south with Zhengzhou at the center. This strategy is likely to further deepen already existing
intra-provincial disparities.134
A new campaign called "Have deep love for Henan, add splendour to the Central Plains" (reai
Henan, zenghui Zhongyuan), established by the provincial leadership in 1999135, is intended
to integrate Henan's population by strengthening provincial identity and sentiments and
focussing their efforts on provincial development. This, too, might be considered an
expression of regionalism. It stands in contrast to central efforts to concentrate everything at
the national level. The core of this campaign is "Henan first", thus implying that Henan's
conditions are unique and that it has to develop regional policies appropriate to its
characteristics that may differ from the policies of the Center. Finally, there is another
development which seems to bring Henan to the forefront. An article in Renmin Ribao
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revealed that Henan belongs to that provinces in which the development of Internet access is
developing most rapidly!136
In summary, the following factors have influenced public perceptions in Henan: (1) historico-
cultural facts: Henan is the cradle and historical center of China, which lost its central
function in the 13th century to the North. This fact is always emphasized in Henan and has
deeply impressed upon its inhabitants. In addition, Henan was continually the scene of
military conflicts as the result of its strategic location. These conflicts undermined the security
of and imperiled the people living there; (2) geographical facts: Henan as a region was
constantly threatened by natural disasters. Life-threatening conditions and social uncertainty
were part of the everyday life of the people. Consequently there was a concentration of (3)
socio-rebellious facts: Millenarist movements, secret religious societies and robber bands
developed as a result of impoverishment, social uncertainty and exploitation. Collective
organizations to defend or gain social rights or for social protection were more developed here
than in many other provinces. It is conceivable that these factors made it easier to implement
collectivistic and egalitarian models such as the people's communes.
What were the reasons that Henan became a Maoist model province? We don't accept
Domenach's argument that the Center in Peking pulled the strings and that Zhengzhou was
politically "only a suburb of Beijing".137 Domenach's argument does not explain why it was
exactly Henan that became a Maoist model. Provinces in fact had the opportunity to
implement centrally agreed upon policies in a relatively independent way. These policies
could be carried out extremely radically. On the other hand, the provinces could choose to
carry out these policies in a moderate manner. The provinces could modify these policies.
They could also, for example, hasten or delay implementation of these policies. In short, the
provinces had considerable policy control and were not merely the puppets of the Center. To
the contrary, Henan forced its policy on the Center by means of establishing the first people's
communes, by popularizing these communes, by highly exaggerated output quotas, which
suggested these quantities had actually been produced by employing the Henan model during
the Great Leap Forward and by the strong "Communist wind". Thus Henan directly
influenced Mao's policy and contributed to the radicalization of the concepts, particulary
regarding collectivism, that Mao and his supporters held.
There is no doubt that the provincial leadership played an important role in creating the
"Henan model". The main supporter of the "Maoist" model during the fifties and early sixties
was Wu Zhipu. He came from Henan, had joined the Communists as a student in Kaifeng in
the twenties and was sent to the Peasant Movement Training Institute at Guangzhou for Party
training in 1926. While training there, Wu met Mao, who lectured at the institute and thus
came into contact with Mao's ideas concerning revolution and the peasantry. After his return,
Wu and other party members from Henan were instructed by the Party to infiltrate the "Red
Spears" and to win them over to the CCP. Wu was so successful that he became a regional
leader and commander of the Red Spears. When the Central Committee, under the influence
of the Comintern in 1927 became highly critical of the Red Spears and their activities and also
criticized Party members who were cooperating with this organization, Wu was suspended
from the CCP.138 This criticism was directed towards Mao and resulted in Wu becoming a
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closer adherent to Mao's politics. Wu's suspension was a crucial experience in his life and
after his membership was restored he was confirmed in his former political opinions. After the
Guomindang had ceased cooperating with the CCP in 1927, Wu joined other cadres in the
mountain areas of Henan and participated in the establishment of the base at Eyuwan. Before
setting off for the mountains, Wu and other members of the Red Spears had sworn blood
brotherhood oath in Kaifeng. Wu used his contacts to members of the Red Spears in order to
strengthen the base in Eyuwan. When he became Governor of Henan in the fifties, he could
count on a large and strong network. This network goes back to the Red Spears as well as to
his contacts in Eyuwan and to his fellow students from Kaifeng. Wu used these relationships
to enforce his "Maoist" conception. At the same time he was in an on-going struggle with
Party Secretary Pan Fusheng. Pan did not come from Henan but instead from Shandong. He
had been Vice-Party Secretary of the newly created province of Pingyuan from 1950-52. Thus
he had no network in Henan and therefore only limited power. During the Great Leap
Forward, Pan was dismissed and Wu became Party Secretary. Because of the above-
mentioned excesses that occured during the Great Leap Forward and his "ultra-left" policies,
Wu was, as mentioned above, lowered to the level of a 2nd Party Secretary in 1961.
Nevertheless, he adhered to his position and was again criticized as "Leftist" in 1964. In 1967
he lost his life in Guangzhou, possibly at the hands of the Red Guards. Wu' s standing in the
province and his relations made it easier for him to carry through his political ideas and
helped those ideas survive via the networks he had created, even after he had been forced
from the political scene. Thus the particulars of this man's career may help to explain why and
how Henan became a model province.139
On the other hand political measures such as the establishment of people's communes and the
implementation of the "Communist wind" could not have been brought about without a
certain measure of support from functionaries and from the people. Even at that time, China
was not so completely and successfully totalitarian that it was not prepared for opposition
from the peasantry and this opposition, particularly in the countryside, could not very easily
be suppressed or ignored. Collectivist traditions and the peasants' hope that social uncertainity
could be minimized by collectivization may have made it to some extent easier to carry out
such measures. Moreover Henan, which had been relatively isolated since the end of the Song
dynasty and had not been touched by foreign influence up to the current century, has
remained conservative and a model for egalitarian peasant imagination up to the present time.
R. H. Tawney' s description of Henan in the thirties may still be true:
"economically primitive, a population of agriculturalists engaged in a desperate struggle
with nature, and taking refuge, when the strain becomes intolerable, in banditry, war or
migration to Manchuria, with neither the surplus resources nor the mentality required to
support a modern state".140
Finally it should not be overlooked that the Communist movement had not been very strong
in Henan before the foundation of the People's Republic. All Communist bases were located
at the frontiers of the province and most of the leading officials had been sent in from outside.
Therefore the Party's power base in Henan was at first rather weak. The traditional rebellious
element of Henan's peasantry, which had vented itself continuously in self-organization and
collective action, needed, as the leadership of the province might have put it, a stronger
political control. Such control was easier to achieve by adopting collective forms such as
higher-level co-operatives or people's communes.
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Finally, Hofheinz argues that the fact that Henan has a huge population and varied terrain as
well as the notion that Henan could gain more from collectivism than from individual
activities may have encouraged collective concepts.141
6 Henan: Model of Fragmentated Authoritarianism - A Case-Study
The history of Henan models has not ended. Indeed the pattern of a single hegemonic
development model has been superseded by political fragmentation. New "model villages"
have emerged in the rural areas recently. They are not characterized by a return to the
responsibility system (family economy) of the late 70s, but by a continuation of or return to
collective forms. The better known villages include Liuzhuang in Qiliying township142 (the
former People's Commune in Xinxiang county, visited by Mao in 1958), Zhulin (Gongxian
county)143 and Nanjie in Linying county. In these villages, private economic activities are
either forbidden (Liuzhuang, Nanjie) or restricted (Zhulin). A number of social benefits are
provided free of cost by the collective. This raises the question of whether or not the tradition
of Henan models is continuing in these models. Using Nanjie144, which became a national
model village in 1997, as an example, we will demonstrate the specific features of present-day
Henan model villages.
Nanjie (South Street Village) is located at the national highway No. 107 (Peking-Shenzhen).
Per information provided by the village leadership, in 1996 the village possessed 26 modern
enterprises that in 1995 had an gross industrial value of 1.16 billion Yuan. 75 % of the
industrial equipment was computer-controlled. The average per-capita income in 1994,
excluding free benefits provided by the village, was 1,800 Yuan. This compares well with the
1,221 Yuan average per-capita income in 1994 in rural areas for China as a whole and the 910
Yuan average per-capita income in Henan. At present China has numerous villages, though
mainly in coastal areas, which were success-stories in the headlines. But Nanjie seems to offer
more. The vice-Party Secretary explained, "We are the only Communist village in the world.
Everything is collectively owned. We are a model village that develops according to the
Maozedong-Thought".145
In 1996 the village had 800 households with 3,130 inhabitants. The main income was derived
from the 26 enterprises. The primary field of production was food processing and included
operations for processing dairy products, instant noodles and frozen food as well as facilities
for brewing beer. By-and-large, the products that were processed here were made from local
agrarian raw materials. 1,300 of the 12,000 employees were people from Nanjie, the rest were
non-locals from eight provinces and 36 counties.
A clear division of labour exists. In general, the local people assumed the white collar-jobs
while the non-locals performed manual labour and  carried out other jobs that are considered
to  be socially inferior such as ordinary services. Piecework dominated the organization of
labour and dismissals were quite frequent as the non-locals could often not bear the pressure
of work and ideology.
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Before 1985 Nanjie qualified as a "poor village". It did not even receive electricity. The
agricultural reform in 1981 and the return to contracted family farming did not solve the
problem of poverty in the village. The vice-Party Secretary reports that many families
continued to live below the subsistence level. The revenues from agriculture did not improve
the living conditions of the majority of the villagers because increasing fees and costs of
production led to decreasing net incomes. Consequently, more and more people switched
from agriculture to individual economy or migrated into the cities. Their land was leased to
non-local people who instead of investing in it, concerned themselves only with immediate
output. As a result, according to data privided by the party secretary of Nanjie, in 1985 the
village reached the lowest level of grain output in decades: 500 Jin per Mu (against 1,000
Jin/Mu in 1978).146 Social disintegration and agrarian decline were accompanied by growing
stratification in the village. Some people became rich through private economic activities
while others, who relied mainly on farming, remained poor. Those who migrated to the cities
were primarily the younger and most capable people. Those who stayed behind were the
women, children and the elderly. The migration of the young villagers, overaging of the
village, disintegration of families and the control of the farm land by non-locals were
perceived by the villagers as symptoms of a massive social and economic crisis in the village.
Due to these phenomena, the village leadership changed its policy in the 80s. In 1986 the
leasing of land to non-local people and allowing land to lie fallow were forbidden. Everybody
who was unable to use the land allocated to him had to return it to the village for
redistribution. In turn, he was provided with free grain by the village. With increasing income
from the non-agricultural sector, more and more households returned their land to the village
collective. In addition, village enterprises leased to private persons had to be returned to the
village. In the future all available resources were to be used only in the interest of the village
community.147
The founding of new enterprises failed, as the banks were not willing to provide loans to the
village. Therefore the Party Committee collected altogether 3,000 Yuan from its members.
Eventually the committee convinced the villagers to contribute money as well. This, remarked
the vice-Party Secretary, was the basis for the large modern enterprises of today. The question
of how a small, poor village like Nanjie could manage to invest umpteen million Yuan, which
was the real basis for these enterprises, was not answered by the deputy Secretary but will be
addressed further below.
6.1 The "Communism" of Nanjie: Patterns of Distribution
There is an assortment of free collective benefits and wage payments that was instituted in
1986. The range of items that are distributed gratis is expanded by one or two per year. In
1996 the following goods and services were provided free of cost: flats of about 90 square
meters including standardized furnishing, colour TV, refrigerator and other electrical
appliances as well as heating; hot water twice a week; very recently also air-conditioning; a
standardized set of clothing; a porcelain statue of Mao; medical care and retirement insurance;
bathing in the public bathing-house; haircuts; electricity, gas, water and coal; 31 foodstuffs as
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well as food in the public canteen; kindergarten and other education through university;
cultural activities; life insurance; agricultural fees and taxes. The village pays for these items
in full. In 1995 the village leadership provided altogether 2.8 mio Yuan for these benefits.
The wage payment component of this distribution system is kept intentionally low. Thus in
1996 manual workers received a monthly average wage of 180 Yuan, with a maximum of 250
Yuan. The vice-Party Secretary reports wages are graded, but with fixed upper limits. This is
true for the village cadres as well. Only the salaries of scientific and technical professionals
were higher (between 500 and 4,000 Yuan), because urban professionals would refuse to
work in village enterprises without high salaries. The wages of non-local workers are 20 to
30% higher than those of local workers because they receive less than the full complement of
the goods and services that are provided gratis to the villagers. There are no bonuses or
overtime allowances.
This mixed system of free goods and services and wages is justified by China‘s current stage
of development. On a national scale, observes the vice-Party Secretary, a socialist system of a
lower stage exists that still demands distribution according to work. The "advanced
Communist spirit" of Nanjie, however, afforded the opportunity to partially adopt a system of
supplying good and services free of cost according to one's needs. The objective of
communism was the elimination of private ownership. This had actually not yet been
achieved. But Nanjie wants to lead the way and take the appropriate steps today. This was the
reason public services and goods were provided free of cost. Thus Nanjie would demonstrate
that "project communismus" had hope and was attainable.
This "communism" is directly linked with the name of Mao. On the occasion of Mao’s 100th
birthday in December, 1993, the village expended 260,000 Yuan to erect a huge marble statue
of him in the central square. This statue is intended to help "carve" the merits of Mao into the
memory of every inhabitant. Members of the uniformed village militia form a guard of honour
around the clock. At fixed hours revolutionary songs from the 60s and and early 70s praising
Mao are broadcast from loudspeakers all over the village. The village leadership declares, that
"Maozedong-Thought" was the guideline for success and for all activities in the village.148
6.2 Material and Symbolic Support
The leadership of Nanjie remains silent regarding the source of the investment capital that
was used to industrialize it. Officials from the administrative city of Luohe unofficially told
us that the financing (credits of about 420 mio Yuan) was provided by banks on instruction
from conservative forces within the political elite of Peking. Nanjie thus ought to be built up
as a "counter-model" to the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen. To this end, a place in a
less-developed area far away from the coastal areas would have been chosen. Certainly the
proximity to markets and sales areas as well as favourable railroad and highway links may
have played an important part in the selection of Nanjie.
The long list of visitors indicates a more conservative touch: Party and military veterans
including Song Ping, Li Desheng, Yang Rudai, Zhang Aiping, Wang Enmao and Xiao Ke, but
also current Party and state leaders such as Qiao Shi, Zhu Rongji, Li Lanqing, Luo Gan and
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Song Jian have visited Nanjie. Qiao Shi, Chairman of the National People's Congress,
declared: "You're doing well, the way is alright!". After his visit, the former Minister of
Defence Zhang Aiping appealed for the propagation of the Nanjie model throughout the
country. Song Ping, a former member of the Politiburo of the CCP, said the village was
"China's Yan'an of today."; the veteran general Li Desheng stated that in Nanjie he had seen
communism. Among the vistors we find two with direct links to Henan. Luo Gan, Secretary
of the State Council, was vice-Gouvernor from 1981-83 and Secretary of the provincial Party
Committee in 1983. Hou Zongbin, deputy Secretary of the Commission for Discipline
Inspection of the Central Committee, was Party Secretary of Henan in the early 90s. It is
possible that Luo Gan, with his key position in the State Council, set the agenda and arranged
for Nanjie to be visited by important Party and state leaders. Luo and Hou thus may be the
link between Nanjie and the Center and may be responsible for setting the village on its
financial foundation.
Visits by important leaders and positive remarks resulted not only in material benefits such as
the opening of markets and the provision of credits, but also to symbolic benefits including
acceptance of structures and policies deviating from the course of the Center and toleration of
indebtedness.
6.3 Objectives and Mechanisms of Enforcement
The following points are the declared objectives of the village: developing a collective
economy, eradicating the private economy, development of a materially prosperous
community, maintenance of a highly-civilized culture, creation of a community that loves the
Party and the nation as well as insuring liberty, equality and happiness for everybody. The
village motto is: "Inside the village collective economy, outside market economy".149
To pursue these objectives in the face of the completely different objectives set by the Center
in Peking requires severe discipline and control measures. Behaviour is therefore assessed
according to a ten-point-system with 10 stars denoting optimal behaviour. The requirements e.
g. refer to: ideology and morality (six ang pinde), respect towards teachers and high esteem
for education (zun shi, zhong jiao), attitude towards labour, the moral-ethical behaviour of
one's family, relationships between neighbours, complying with birth planning, behaviour
towards the environment and hygiene, commitment to the well-being of the village
community. If a family loses one point or star the supply of one benefit free of cost, such as
the gratis provision of coal, electricity, gas, water or food, is cancelled. In this case those
goods or services have to be bought from the collective at high prices. Anyone who violates
the rules regarding labour discipline or the village community is subjected to one of the
following "education methods": (a) criticism and self-criticism, (b) "film show" (yan
dianying) or (c) assignment to a "study course for spiritual civilization". "Film show" means
the offender must stand on a platform in front of the village audience and loudly utter the
circumstances of his wrong-doing. Even the village cadres admit that this effects a
tremendous psychical pressure on the persons affected: "Even your own children won't look at
you for days". The inhabitants of Nanjie seem to fear this punishment most of all, because it
implies a direct loss of face in public. In order to avoid such a punishment, the villagers will
eagerly study the works of Chairman Mao, because, the village cadres assert, "They want to
avoid mistakes".150
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Moreover, according to the specific situation, special measures for maintaining social order
are undertaken. For example should a man repeatedly beat his wife, he may not only have to
practice self-criticism, but also be placed under the obligation to get the relationship with his
wife in order. Two neighbors who quarrel frequently may have to pull down the wall between
their flats to force them to harmonize their mutual relations. Women who often squabble over
their children may be ordered to perform several "film shows".151
Such a law, explains the Party Secretary, corresponds with rustic concepts of law.152 Indeed
the village community in Nanjie refers to the violation of village law, not to the violation of
State law. The latter is openly and with approval of the higher authorities subordinated to the
village law and thus provides a demonstration of the lack of consciousness of legality that
exists not only on the local level. Accordingly, the vice-Party Secretary answered, when
questioned regarding what would happen should someone transgress not the state law, but
Maozedong-Thought, "I don't know anything about the state law. But here he will be
punished".
Not only the state's law, but also official policy is openly circumvented here. For example,
although the Chinese constitution explicitly guarantees the right of private economic
activities, the question of what would happen if someone wished to establish a private
enterprise was answered thusly: "Nobody has such an intention here", and if someone has, he
has to leave the village.
The village law is intended to secure social discipline. The public objectives of education
have the same purpose: to educate to (a) "the ideal of socialism and communism", that is "to
love the collective" and to "sacrifice oneself in the interest of the community"; (b) obey the
village discipline; (c) obey Maozedong-Thought as interpreted by the village leadership; (d)
create "civilization".153 In the final analysis, obeying Maozedong-Thought as interpreted by
the village leadership (c) and creating "civilization", are directed to inculcating "the ideal of
socialism and communism" (a) and obedience to village discipline (b). Education thus serves
the maintenance of order in the village community and the subordination of all interests to the
interest of that community. These are in principle traditional values of village life. As the
village Party Secretary put it: "Without rigorousness there exists no order. Order in the state
starts at the villages. If you want to have order in the state, you have at first to enforce it in the
villages."
The village leadership proudly declares Nanjie to be free of criminality. For five years no
criminal offence has occured. "Decadent phenomena" such as discos, karaoke-clubs, bars and
saunas do not exist. There is to be no market for decadent urban culture. The thinking of Mao
is to dominate here, and Nanjie had, still,  the "dictatorship of the proletariat ".154
This Law and Order-thinking was rewarded in 1997: Nanjie became one of the villages that
were honoured as "model village in terms of civilization" by the Propaganda Department of
the Central Committee of the CCP.155
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6.4 Mao-Cult as a Substitute for Religion
Since 1984 there have been "three great activities" (san da huodong) for the village
inhabitants: "great"  studying of the works of Mao Zedong, "great" singing of revolutionary
songs and "great" learning from Lei Feng. The village-owned printing factory publishes
works of Mao, which must be read and discussed by the villagers as well as by workers
coming from outside the village in special study groups. Such study groups are organized and
supervised by the management of the enterprises. Every worker and employee is obliged to
submit "written reports of experience" at fixed intervals, to learn at least one revolutionary
song per month and to carry out at least two good deeds. It is argued that in the process of
economic development people need a "faith" as well.
A precondition for getting a job in Nanjie is the ability to, "recite some quotations of
Chairman Mao". It is made clear that memorization is expected.156 Maozedong-Thought as
well as the Mao monument are both called the "Red Sun that enlightens Nanjie". Village
Party Secretary Wang Hongbin proclaimed on the occasion of the inaugural ceremony of the
statue of Mao, "Through the illumination of his ideas the people are led from darkness to the
light, from poverty to wealth." The thoughts of Mao have enlightened every step of the
inhabitants of Nanjie in the last years. Every villager was to pass the monument at least once a
day in order to be "enlightened".157
It is openly declared that the people of Nanjie perceive Mao as a god for the protection of the
village (baohu shen). If Mao were not present, the people would feel "uneasy in their hearts".
Therefore many people carry an amulet with a picture of Mao around their neck.
6.5 Nanjie: A Model Directed from Above?
Nanjie's development process was without doubt promoted by influential conservative forces
in the Party elite on both the central and provincial levels. This is illustrated through the visits
by  many leading officials as well as by the huge amount of investment. From the standpoint
of conservative forces Nanjie is indeed a counter-model against the Special Economic Zones
in the coastal areas where foreign economic influences dominate and against models like
Wenzhou that primarily foster the private economic sector. As a counter-model it is intended
to prove that economic development without social erosion on a collective basis is possible as
well. The Mao cult is at the same time the ethical-moral foundation of social order.
But it would be wrong to reduce the development of the village to initiatives from higher
authorities alone. The support from above contributed to the break-up of the traditional
village, to the elimination of obstacles to the modernization process and to the
commerzialization of the village economy. Processes of commerzialization may negatively
impact the peasants, for example through  the collapse of the subsistence economy, migration,
disintegration of the village community and decay of the traditional social structures and
values.
The rigid system of village order seems to be quite accepted by the majority of the villagers.
Its legitimacy is based on social benefits such as social security, which hardly exists in other
rural areas; material security through relatively high wages and including welfare provisions;
                                         
156 Lixiang zhiguang, vol 1: p. 19.
157 Lixiang zhiguang, vol 1: pp. 15-17.
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access to professional positions with social prestige and access to education as well as on the
enforcement of common concepts of order.158
At the same time our analysis has to include factors that originated in the village itself. These
factors include:
- The desire to adjust to modernization by using its advantages without destroying the
social integration of the village community and its values. The "Nanjie model" represents
therefore the achievement of social prosperity without the polarization, urbanization and
industrialization of the village. Additionally, the transformation of the peasants into non-
agricultural workers has been achieved within the framework of the "Nanjie model"
without disintegration of the village community.
- A protest against growing income disparities and the hegemony of urban culture that is
perceived as decadent and corrupt and related to karaoke, discos, bars, pornography,
prostitution and individualism. Nanjie therefore also represents a rejection of city dwellers
discrimination against the peasants. In addition there exists the sense that private
entrepreneurship benefits individual interests, but not the interests of the community.
- A "symbolic opposition"159 to the dominance of the urban areas and their culture which is
perceived as unbearable. Thus the predominant political line which is connected with the
name of Deng Xiaoping and that favors the cities and urban dwellers and gives priority to
individualistic tendencies at the expense of the sense of community is rejected.
- A reaction to the village leadership’s authority crisis which resulted when the local cadres
lost a large part of their control of the community and the village's resources during the
implementation of the responsibility system in the countryside.
- The policy of creating the preconditions for upward mobility of its peasant residents with
economic and educational opportunities without which the chance for personal
qualification and social advancement is normally extremely difficult to achieve.
- In addition, Nanjie symbolizes resistance against state socialism that favours state-owned
enterprises and the socialist cities at the expense of the villages. The peasants are not
served by the network of social welfare benefits that supplies the employees in state-
owned enterprises with social security, secure jobs, a regular income, and subsidized
consumer goods. The peasants are not subsidized by the state. Therefore the development
of Nanjie is as well an expression of rural protest against a system of economic
exploitation in which cheap agrarian resources and products flow into the cities, but in
which the rural population frequently cannot afford to buy the expensive goods
manufactured from the resources. Nanjie takes an alternative route: It uses its resources
for its own purpose and sells the final products to the urban and rural population. 160
                                         
158 One may ask oneself what will happen to the "model", if the social welfare could not be uphold, e. g. due to
an economic crisis.
159 So James C. Scott, Protest and Profanation. Agrarian Revolt and the Little Tradition, Part I, in: Theory and
Society, 4 (1977): p. 17.
160 See: Thomas Heberer, The Power of the Fait Accompli: The Peasantry as the Motive Force of Change in the
People's Republic of China, Occasional Papers No. 3, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, Trier
University, Trier 1996.
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All these measures in Nanjie are in the interest of its economic development: the rigid
discipline and the system of sanctions in case of  deviant behaviour; the Mao cult and the
studying of Mao-Zedong-Thought in order to focus all the energies of the labor-force on the
interests of the collective; the free supply with goods for daily needs in order to foster the idea
of a community interest and to minimize that what socialist theory called contradiction
between wage labor and capital.
The Mao cult is related to the tradition of local deities and chiliastic movements which were
particularly popular in Henan. They always surfaced in times of erosion of traditional norms
and relationships. An eschatological, egalitarian ideal was created, as counterpoint to the
symptoms of decay and social disintegration of that period. At the same time the Mao cult
presents an alternative to the present rampant religious revitalization movements in the
province.
Finally, we come to the question of why this model is not more widely adopted. A
popularization would as a rule require two conditions: First, such a success story is impossible
without massive support from higher authorities. The resources for such support are limited
and are to be employed in individual cases only, that is for particular "models" and their
political instrumentalization. Second, the vast majority of peasants oppose collective economy
due to negative experiences with that economy since the 50s. Instead, the peasants prefer
family economy. However the large number of visitors who tour Nanjie every year, including
246,000 in 1995 and 180,000 from January-September in 1996, demonstrates that this model
has captured some portion of the public’s attention in, primarily, the rural areas. The basis for
this public relations success lies in the very fact that it is not only economically successful but
also technologically highly-developed and at the same time a model for a secure material life
in the countryside, including social security and order. At the same time it seems to be a
model for successfully maintaining a community spirit that is characterized by
indigeneousness, collectivism, egalitarianism and intense Chineseness represented by Mao. It
appears to prove that economic development must not necessarily lead to instability,
inequality and social insecurity. Therefore it is not a pure economic model, but rather a moral
one: for discipline, order, "clean" social morality and social cleanliness, egalitarianism,
economic-technological modernization, a reaction to the impact of social change on the
village community and a reaction to the authority crisis in the village.
7 Conclusions
Nanjie demonstrates that China cannot be understood as an homogeneous entity. Locally there
exist instead different models of development side by side. In Luohe there is not only the
Nanjie model but also another model in which all economic activities are privatized. The
simultaneous existence of two models that seem to be incompatible with each other is not
only an indication of China's pluralization, but also indicates the existence of a spectrum of
various development models with different objectives. This illustrates the fragmentation of
politics ("fragmented authoritarianism") and is a vivid example of the realization of "one
country, two systems" inside China.
Villages like Nanjie are not simply a continuation of the history of the Henan models, because
· there is no longer only a single model to be emulated by everybody. At present Nanjie is
only one model among others in the province and must compete with different models.
Thus Henan evolved from a Maoist-unitary model to a kind of model pluralism.
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· In contrast to former models Nanjie acts in a market economic manner, while within it is
organized in a collectiv-egalitarian way.
· Nanjie is built on prosperity rather than on poverty.
· The idea underlying Nanjie is a reaction to social changes as opposed to an initiation of
social change.
The province no longer claims to be a general model, but promotes variety. The fragmented
authoritarianism manifests itself in the fragmentation of models.
The case of Henan shows that provincial leaders are not merely agents of the Center.
Provincial leaders frequently opposed policies from Peking. Pan Fusheng for example
opposed the policy of socialization which was far too rapid. Wu Zhipu implemented a
"Leftist" policy, however his spreading of false information and data had a larger impact on
Mao and the central policy. After the Cultural Revolution the Henan leadership opposed for
many years the reform policy adopted by the Center.
Central policy may be opposed on the provincial, the prefecture, the city/county or the village
level. Nanjie's policies, for example, could be interpreted as opposing the policy of Deng
Xiaoping on the village level. The example of Henan demonstrates that the relationship
between the Center and the provinces is not only a hierarchical superordinate-subordinate one,
but has to be understood as an interactive process, in which both sides endeavour to achieve
their respective goals. The Center determines the framework, but the provinces react by
putting pressure on the Center, in the event the policy of the latter is not appropriate for local
conditions. Provinces possess power because they are are in a intermediary position between
the Center and the subprovincial administration units (prefectures, cities/counties, townships,
villages). In order to govern the society, the Center must rely on the support of the provincial
leadership and make compromises.161 Finally, as shown above, an analysis of a province has
to consider a combination of factors:
· the historical-cultural dimension that manifests itself in the collective consciousness of the
population and in the local political culture;
· geographic-economic factors;
· the recent political history, including the political behaviour of provincial leaders and their
response to pressure from above (Center) and below (subordinated administrative units,
cadres, local population).
                                         
161 This is demonstated by Linda Chelan Li, Towards a Non-zero-sum Interactive Framework of Spatial Politics:
the Case of Centre-Province in Contemporary China, in: Political Studies, vol. XLV (1997): pp. 49-65.
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